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STANDBY CREDITS IN CANADA*
Gordon B. Graham** and Benjamin Geva * * *
Introduction
In recent years we have witnessed a substantial increase in the
number of Canadian cases involving disputes as to the nature of
the issuer's undertaking under a documentary letter of credit.'
This coincided with a rapid growth in the use of the letter of credit
as a standby credit facility in domestic and international
transactions.la This article will examine the nature and scope of
the issuer's undertaking under the standby letter of credit taking
into account the various commercial uses and the types of
disputes involved.
Part I will outline current uses of documentary letters of credit,
identify the governing law and examine the legal basis for the
This article is based on a paper "Documentary Credits - Introduction to Canadian Law
and Practice", presented on October 14, 1983 at the 13th Annual Commercial and
Consumer Law Workshop in Toronto. The article consolidates and expands on certain
aspects of the original paper. Copyright © 1984, by Gordon B. Graham and Benjamin
Geva.
Of the Ontario Bar; Partner, Blake, Cassels and Graydon, Toronto.
Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
During the fall of 1983, when the paper was written and presented, Professor Geva was
on leave from Osgoode Hall Law School and was an associate at Blake, Cassels and
Graydon, Toronto.
1 Since 1979, the reported cases are Aspen Planners Ltd. v. Commerce Masonry &
Forming Ltd. (1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 546, 7 B.L.R. 102, 25 O.R. (2d) 167 (H.C.J.);
C.D.N. Research & Development Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1980), 18 C.P.C. 62
(Ont. H.C.J.); Rosen v. Pullen (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 62,16 B.L.R. 28 (Ont. H.C.J.);
Kanetmatsu-Gosho (Canada) Inc. v. Sinclair Supplies Ltd. (1982), 16 B.L.R. 89, 37 A.R.
514 (O.B., Master's Chambers); C.D.N. Research and Development Ltd. v. Bank of
Nova Scotia (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 656, 39 O.R. (2d) 13 (H.C.J. Div. Ct.), varg 122
D.L.R. (3d) 485,32 O.R. (2d) 578 (H.C.J.); Michael Doyle & Associates Ltd. v. Bank of
Montreal (1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 596, 19 B.L.R. 62, [1982] 6 W.W.R. 24 (B.C. S.C.);
and Henderson v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1982), 40 B.C.L.R. 318 (S.C.,
in Chambers); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Madill (1983), 150 D.L.R. (3d)
417, 43 O.R. (2d) 1, 2 C.C.L.T. 75 (C.A.); Canadian Pioneer Petroleums Inc. v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp., [1984] 2 W.W.R. 563, 30 Sask. R. 315 (Q.B.).
la See in general, infra, text at footnotes 10-15.
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issuer's liability to the beneficiary of the documentary credit. Part
II will examine the principle of the autonomy of letters of credit
and the fraud exception, particularly as applied by case law to the
standby credit. The standard of compliance with documentary
requirements does not raise issues specific to standby credits and
will not be discussed. Part III will re-examine the autonomy
principle, with particular emphasis on difficulties involved in
application of the principle in light of the many uses of standby
credits and possible disparity in the parties' intentions.
The ultimate goal of this article is to consider the effect the
wide use of standby credits may have on letters of credit law,
taking into account the commercial setting and policy considera-
tions, and to present a comprehensive review of the principles of
law governing the standby credit in Canada. 2
I. The Documentary Credit: Its Uses, Nature and Binding Effect
A letter of credit is an engagement by one party (the "issuer"),
normally a bank 3 made at the request of another party (the
"applicant" or "account-party"), normally a customer of the
bank, to the effect that the issuer will honour drafts or other
demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions
specified in the letter.4 In the case of a documentary letter of
credit5 (hereafter "documentary credit", "credit" or "letter of
credit"), a third party (the "beneficiary"), normally a creditor of
2 Needless to say, the basic legal principles of letter of credit law are not Canadian made.
Classic works presenting these general principles are Boris Kozolchyk, Commercial
Letters of Credit in The Americas: a comparative study of contemporary commercial
transactions (Albany, M. Bender, 1966); E.P. Ellinger, Documentary Letters of Credit: a
comparative study (Singapore, University of Singapore Press, 1970); and H.C.
Gutteridge and Maurice Megrah, The Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits, 6th ed.
(London, Europa Publications, 1979). A recent Canadian overview is presented by
Sarna, "Letters of Credit: Aspects of the Law and Practice" in L. Sarna, ed., Corporate
Structure Finance and Operations: essays on the law and business practice, Vol. II
(Toronto, Carswell Co. Ltd., 1982), p. 331.
3 Normally, but not necessarily. See e.g., Kanetmatsu-Gosho (Canada) Inc. v. Sinclair
Supplies Ltd., supra, footnote 1, dealing with a letter of credit issued by a company in
connection with liability of its subsidiary. For letters of credit issued by non-bank
financial institutions, see, infra, text preceding footnote 15a.
4 See e.g., Wichita Eagle and Beacon Publishing Co., Inc. v. Pacific National Bank of San
Francisco, 493 F. 2d 1285 (9th Cir., 1974), revg 343 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal., 1971).
5 The documentary credit is to be distinguished from the open letter of credit. The latter is
designed to enable a merchant travelling overseas to raise funds. See in general Ellinger,
op. cit., footnote 2, at pp. 5-7.
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the applicant, must make demand for payment upon the issuer by
presenting a draft6 and the documents specified in the letter of
credit.
The letter of credit traditionally has been used as a payment
mechanism in the international sale of goods. 7 A letter of credit
so used (hereafter a "commercial letter of credit" or "commercial
credit") is a promise by its issuer directly to the seller, made at
the request of the buyer, to pay the purchase price of goods to the
seller, or to accept a draft drawn by the seller for an equivalent
amount. The pre-condition to payment or honour of the draft is
simply that the shipping documents representing the goods and if
applicable other relevant documents shall have been tendered to
a bank (the issuing bank itself or a bank designated by it) on or
before a specified date. 8
The following example may be helpful. Suppose a Canadian
buyer wants to import goods from Japan. The Japanese seller
wants to be assured of payment after shipping the goods and
delivering related documents of title. The buyer, however, will
not risk payment in advance. A reasonable compromise is a
contract for sale which calls for payment by letter of credit. The
buyer-applicant is required to issue or "open" a letter of credit in
favour of the seller-beneficiary. The Canadian bank will arrange
for the "advising bank" to advise the seller of the arrangement. A
convenient branch of the advising bank in Japan will be desig-
nated as the place where the seller will present the draft and
shipping documents for acceptance or payment.
If the credit issued by the Canadian bank and advised to the
seller by the Japanese bank is an "unconfirmed credit", the
advising bank incurs no liability by merely notifying the benefi-
ciary of the opening of the credit. However, if the seller is not
satisfied with the promise of the Canadian bank it may insist upon
an engagement by a local bank and the contract of sale will call
for a confirmed credit. In such a case, the Canadian bank will ask
6 The draft is normally drawn on the issuer or a bank designated by the issuer, to the
beneficiary's own order. No drafts are used in connection with a deferred payment credit
(namely a credit under which payment is made after expiry of a stated period from
presentation).
7 See e.g., Harold J. Berman and Colin Kaufman, "The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Les Mercantoria)", 19 Har. Int. L.J. 221 (1978), at pp. 246-54.
8 See e.g., Ellinger, "The Relationship Between Banker and Buyer Under Documentary
Letters of Credit", 7 U.W. Aust. L. Rev. 40 (1966), at p. 40, note 1.
[Vol. 9
Standby Credits in Canada 183
the Japanese bank (now a "confirming bank") to add its own
undertaking to honour the credit on presentation of the
documents. This added undertaking is known as a "confirma-
tion", and the credit becomes a "confirmed credit". The
confirmed credit gives the seller the advantage of a separate and
additional payment commitment from a bank chosen by the
seller. 9
In recent years the documentary credit has been used increas-
ingly as a security device in both international and domestic trans-
actions. In this context it is known as a "standby credit" or
"guarantee credit". 10 Such a credit is not usually drawn upon if
the underlying transaction runs smoothly. It resembles the tradi-
tional commercial credit in that it is issued by a bank at the
request of a bank. It also involves an undertaking to make
payment upon presentment of a document. Unlike the
commercial credit, however, the standby credit involves payment
by the issuer only if the bank customer fails to render payment or
performance to the beneficiary.'1
An example of a typical transaction in which the standby credit
is used domestically is a construction contract. The construction
company may require the landowner to procure the issuance of a
standby credit to ensure payment for a building. The letter of
credit would provide that the bank would honour the
construction company's draft when accompanied, for example,
9 In general, for the mechanism of commercial credit, the various arrangements and
undertakings, see e.g., R.M. Goode, Commercial Law (Hammondsworth, Penguin
Books, 1982), c. 24. See also David Smout, "The Finance of Overseas Sales", 19 The
Convey. (N.S.) 33 (1955). For a Canadian perspective, see e.g., C.E. O'Connor,
"Payment and Financing Mechanisms in International Trade and the Role of the
Canadian Export Corporation", in J.S. Ziegel and W.C. Graham, eds., New Dimensions
in International Trade Law: A Canadian Perspective (Toronto, Butterworths, 1982), at p.
58.
10 In general, for the standby credit, see e.g., Ellinger and J. Barry, "Standby Letters of
Credit", 6 Int. Bus. L. 604 (1978), and Kozolchyk, "The Emerging Law of Standby
Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees", 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 319 (1982). For the
emergence of these devices as a by-product of the restrictions on American banks to
issue guarantees, see Richard A. Lord, "The No Guarantee Rule and the Standby
Letter of Credit Controversy", 96 Ban. L.J. 46 (1979).
11 There has been a recent controversy in the United States as to whether the honouring of
such a credit after the applicant's bankruptcy does not involve a voidable preference
where the bank's right to reimbursement is secured by an interest in the applicant's
property. See e.g., Douglas G. Baird, "Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy", 49 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 130 (1982); Kozolchyk, op. cit., footnote 10, at pp. 335-41; and Counsel's
Corner, "Unscrewing Twistcap", 100 Ban. L.J. 636 (1983).
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by an architect's certificate that the construction has progressed
to a given stage of completion and a certificate given by the
contruction company itself that it had not been paid. In addition,
the landowner might also require the construction company to
procure the issuance of a standby credit to ensure completion of
the building. This credit would be drawn upon by the landowner
upon presenting the issuing bank with a draft accompanied by a
declaration that the construction company had failed to perform
its obligations under the construction contract.
Unlike the commercial credit, which is a payment device, the
standby credit is primarily a security device and can be used to
secure performance of the applicant's non-monetary obligations
to the beneficiary. It is functionally similar to a performance or
delivery bond. lla
As noted by Professor Baird, 12 standby credits are often also
used in connection with the domestic or international sale of
goods to secure obligations other than payment of the purchase
price. A supplier of raw materials would rather have a standby
credit issued as the functional equivalent of payment than as a
security interest in the goods themselves, since the costs
associated with realization would render it an inadequate
remedy. A buyer of manufactured goods might want protection
for advances to suppliers to finance the purchase of raw materials.
A satisfactory security in the raw materials would often not be
feasible or available, but the letter of credit effectively secures the
buyer against the supplier's bankruptcy or default. A seller of
manufactured goods or commodities might also prefer a standby
credit to a purchase money security interest in the goods if the
risk of depreciation or price fluctuation cannot be offset by a
short payment schedule. Finally, according to Professor Baird, a
business that wishes to raise money may issue commercial paper
backed by a standby letter of credit.
There has been remarkable growth in the use of standby letters
Ia A performance bond issued in favour of an obligee (buyer), guarantees the actual
performance of the contract by the principal (seller) in accordance with its specified
terms and conditions. In a case of a construction contract, the performance bond is
issued in favour of the landowner and guarantees to him performance by the
construction company. Performance bonds are issued in Canada by surety bond
companies. A delivery bond is issued in connection with the sale of goods. It
guarantees to the obligee the delivery of goods by the principal.
12 Op cit., footnote 11, at pp. 135-9.
[Vol. 9
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of credit in Canada, particularly in the last five years. Standby
credits have been used, inter alia, in the following situations:
(a) as deposits (or in lieu of down payments) in sale of goods and
investment transactions;
(b) as prepayment of fees for services;
(c) to secure undertakings under subdivision agreements;
(d) to back the financial responsibility of developers;
(e) to back warranties such as to the clearing of title defects or to
the sufficiency of a fund;
(f) to gear payments to the occurrence of events like progress in
construction or planning approvals;(g) to support borrowings under international loans;
(h) to ensure availability of supplies;
(i) as performance guarantees in construction and other
contracts; and
(j) in project financing to spread completion, credit or regulatory
approval risks.
According to Gordon Sedgwick, 13  standby credits are
commonly used in Canadian export transactions in three situa-
tions:
(a) in connection with the sale of capital goods by a Canadian seller to a
foreign buyer to secure to the foreign buyer the return of a deposit or the
reimbursement of an advance payment under the sale contract relating to
the capital goods to be manufactured in Canada and delivered to the
foreign country, in event of the failure of the Canadian seller to deliver the
capital goods;
(b) in connection with contract tenders where the bid of a Canadian
contractor is accepted and the contract is awarded to the Canadian
contractor to deliver goods or perform services or both in the foreign
country, to secure the foreign buyer in the event of the failure of the
Canadian contractor to proceed with the contract awarded ... ;
(c) in connection with the contracts for the performance of services by a
Canadian contractor in a foreign country or for the sale of goods and
related services by a Canadian seller to a foreign country, to secure the
foreign buyer or owner if the Canadian contractor or seller fails to perform
the contract ....
Standby credits are also used in connection with counter-trade
agreements. 14 Under a counter-purchase contract, a Canadian
13 G.G. Sedgwick, "Aspects of Payment and Financing Mechanisms in the Export Trade"
in New Dimensions in International Trade Law, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 87-8.14 See e.g., I. Feltham, "Countertrade: Barter of the Eighties", address to the Law
Institute of the Pacific Rim, Toronto, September 14, 1983.
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seller might undertake the purchase of goods from his foreign
buyer. This undertaking could be given to induce the foreign
buyer, concurrently, to enter into the principal contract for the
purchase of the Canadian product. If the supply of the foreign
goods to Canada were to be made over a long period, the foreign
buyer (seller of the foreign goods) might require the Canadian
seller (buyer of the foreign goods) to provide a standby credit.
The credit would be drawn upon by the foreign party if his
Canadian counterpart failed to purchase the foreign goods.
Recent case law in Canada also demonstrates that the standby
credit can be used less conventionally. In Rosen v. Pullen,15 a
standby credit was used in connection with a cohabitation
agreement to ensure that the performance of one party would not
go unrewarded.
In Canada, commercial credits usually are issued by banks. The
international payment function requires a telecommunications
and correspondence network that only banks seem to have.
Standby credits also are most frequently issued in Canada by
banks. However, the latter credits are also issued by others such
as trust companies and major credit unions. In this regard, no
significant discussion of possible regulatory issues has yet
surfaced.
So far as banks are concerned, issuance of letters of credit is a
traditional banking service and as such falls within the general
banking power presently allowed under s. 173(1) of the Bank
Act. 15a Other institutions issue credits under their general
corporate powers and presumably view the amount of each credit
as a loan asset and then, as applicable, ensure compliance with
asset ratio tests or other regulatory constraints.
Documentary credits are usually, by express reference, made
subject to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits ("UCP"). Banks in 165 countries adhere to these rules
issued by the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"). The
15 Supra, footnote 1.
15a S.C. 1980, c. C-40, s. 2. Section 173(1)(g) of the Bank Act provides that a bank's power
to give a guarantee for payment of fixed sums of money is subject to any terms and
conditions prescribed by regulation. The Act does not expressly deal with a bank's
power to issue letters of credit. Unless it were judicially determined that a standby
letter of credit is, at least for purposes of the statute, a guarantee, it seems the
limitation of a bank's power to give a guarantee is not relevant. Provided issuance of a
credit is in accordance with established practice, it will be within the scope of the
general banking power conferred by s. 173(1).
[Vol. 9
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current operational version is the 1974 Revision. A 1983 Revision
is expected to come into operation on October 1, 1984.16 The
1983 Revision states that it applies "to all documentary credits,
including ... standby letters of credit.'1 7 The practice of incorpo-
rating the UCP into standby credits, which is common but not
universal, preceded the drafting of the 1983 Revision.
Professor Goode states that "[t]he traditional view in England
is that the UCP is simply a set of standard rules having no legal
force except so far as incorporated by reference into the contract
between the parties concerned."'1 8 It thus follows that "so far as
English law is concerned, the UCP is subordinate to legislation,
may be excluded or restricted by contract, and if incorporated
into the contract is, as a set of contractual terms, subject to the
court's normal powers, at common law and by statute, to
adjudicate upon the enforceability of contracted provisions."' 19
This is probably also true in Canada. Where the UCP is not
expressly referred to in a letter of credit, the instrument will be
governed by general principles of law and, in the case of
commercial credits, by mercantile usage. Not surprisingly, to
achieve this result the UCP itself might be taken as the best
evidence of prevailing mercantile usage. In any event, the binding
effect of the instrument is a matter to be determined under
general principles of law.
In the United States, letters of credit are governed by Article 5
of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter "UCC Article
5").19a However, New York State, a major international financial
centre, has enacted a law excluding the application of UCC
Article 5 to any letter of credit which by express agreement or
course of dealing was subject to the UCP. 20
Letters of credit may be revocable or irrevocable. A revocable
16 For a historical overview, see Berman and Kaufman, op. cit., footnote 7, at pp. 250-1.
For the 1974 version see e.g., Christopher S. Axworthy, "The Revision of the Uniform
Customs on Documentary Credits", [19711 J. Bus. L. 38; and B.S. Wheble, "Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (1974 Revision)", [1975] J. Bus. L. 281.
For an update of the historical account and for the 1983 version, see Schmitthoff, "The
New Uniform Customs for Letters of Credit", [19831 J. Bus. L. 193.
17 Article 1. All UCP cites in this article are from the 1983 Revision.
18 Goode, op cit., footnote 9, at p. 656.
19 Goode, ibid., at pp. 657-8. Cf. Megrah, "Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977", 2 Int. Ban.
L. 74 (1983).
19a See in general H. Harfield, Letters of Credit (1979).
20 See Berman and Kaufman, op. cit., footnote 7, at p. 251 and note 88.
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credit may be cancelled by the issuer without notice, but of course
cancellation does not affect rights already acquired by reliance,
payment or acceptance prior to cancellation. An irrevocable
credit, on the other hand, commits the issuer to honour the
credit, notwithstanding contrary instructions by the customer,
provided the terms of the credit are fulfilled by the beneficiary. 21
The revocable credit will obviously be of little value as a security
device. In practice it would be used simply as a payment
mechanism where the beneficiary is not concerned with the credit
worthiness of the applicant. 22 It would be quite useless as a
standby credit and accordingly careful note must be taken of the
UCP which provides that, in the absence of an indication on the
letter, a credit shall be deemed to be revocable. 23 Our principle
concern in this article will thus be the more widely used irrevo-
cable credit. 24
The effect of the documentary credit on the obligation for
which it is given should be noted. In connection with the
commercial credit, it has been held that "in the ordinary way,
when the contract for sale stipulates for payment to be made by
.. irrevocable letter of credit, then, when the letter of credit is
issued and accepted by the seller, it operates as conditional
payment of the price. It does not operate as absolute payment. '25
Accordingly, "[i]f the letter of credit is honoured by the bank
when the documents are presented to it, the [buyer's] debt is
discharged. If it is not honoured the debt is not discharged; and
the seller has a remedy in damages against both banker and
buyer." 26 Presumably, the buyer's debt is revived at the expiry of
the credit where no timely proper demand has been made. The
21 UCP Articles 7, 9 and 10.
22 See in general, Goode, op. cit., footnote 9, at pp. 648-51.
23 Article 7(c).
24 See e.g., C. D. N. Research and Development Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, supra,
footnote 1, at pp. 659-60 D.L.R., pp. 16-17 O.R., where the court regarded the perfor-
mance guarantee as irrevocable notwithstanding its silence on the point, and the
contrary UCP rule as to such silence (see text which follows).
25 W.J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co., [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 313 at p.
323, [197212 All E.R. 127 at p. 139 (C.A.), per Lord Denning.
26 Ibid. El Nasr was followed in Maran Road Saw Mill v. Austin Taylor & Co. Ltd., [1975]
1 Lloyd's Rep. 156 (Q.B. Com. Ct.). See also E.D. & F. Man Ltd. v. Nigerian Sweets &
Confectionery Co. Ltd., [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 50 (Q.B. Com. Ct.). For an extensive
discussion, see Malcolm Clarke, "Bankers' Commercial Credits Among the High
Trees", [1974] Camb. L. J. 260 at pp. 269-76.
[Vol. 9
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conditional payment rule is currently codified in the United States
in UCC 2-325(2).27
The conditional payment theory does not apply to standby
credits. The standby credit is given as collateral security and not
as a payment instrument. It is called upon only on the failure of
the principal debtor, namely the applicant on the letter of
credit. 28 Yet, whether as conditional payment or as collateral
security, the documentary credit is not a guarantee of the appli-
cant's undertaking towards the beneficiary. Rather, it is a
separate and distinct undertaking of the issuer which is not
dependent on the enforceability or content of the applicant's
undertaking under his contract with the beneficiary. Unlike a
guarantee which is a secondary and collateral undertaking
dependent on the principal obligation, the documentary credit is
a primary and independent obligation. 29 It depends alone on the
presentment of documents and, even in the case of a standby
credit, not on the default of the applicant. 30 The issuer's under-
taking, not being dependent on any loss caused to the beneficiary,
but rather on the presentment of documents, is also not an
indemnity. 31 It constitutes an engagement to pay upon tender of
specified documents.
It seems universally accepted that, vis-A-vis the beneficiary, 32
the issuance of the documentary credit binds the issuer, and
confirmation binds the confirming bank, as soon as the opening of
the credit is communicated to the beneficiary. 33 In the absence of
a universally accepted third party beneficiary doctrine, however,
the enforceability of the banker's undertaking in the beneficiary's
hands remains theoretically obscure. It is difficult from a common
law standpoint to identify consideration moving from the
beneficiary. 34 The difficulty is that all relevant seller's obligations
27 The Ontario Law Reform Commission ("O.L.R.C.") recommended that "the revised
[Sale of Goods] Act incorporate a [comparable] provision". See O.L.R.C., Report on
Sale of Goods (Toronto, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney-General, 1979), Vol. II, at p.
357, and s. 5.25(3) of the Draft Bill to Revise the Sale of Goods Act (Vol. III of the
Report).
28 See, supra, text at footnote 11.
29 For the nature of the guarantee, see e.g., Goode, op. cit., footnote 9, at p. 875.
30 The point is enlarged upon in Part II, infra.
31 For the nature of indemnity contract, see e.g., Goode, op. cit., footnote 9, at p. 875.
32 As well as vis-A-vis any negotiating bank (under a negotiation credit). For the
theoretical basis of this liability, see Re Agra and Masterman's Bank, Ex p. Asiatic
Banking Corporation (1867), L.R. 2 Ch. App. 391.
33 See e.g., Goode, op. cit., footnote 9, at p. 658 and Gutteridge and Megrah, op. cit.,
footnote 2, at p. 33.
34 See e.g., Gutteridge and Megrah, ibid., at pp. 24-8. The buyer's duty to procure the
1984]
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arise from the sale agreement and "the contract of sale is almost
invariably made before the banker issues his credit, so that such
consideration would be past. 35 The binding effect of the irrevo-
cable credit as a separate contract vis-A-vis the beneficiary, can be
explained only on the basis of mercantile usage 36 or by treating
the irrevocable credit as a new type of mercantile currency
embodying an abstract promise to pay independent of any actual
agreement between payor and payee. 37 The failure to find an
acceptable common law theory has not, however, resulted in
serious doubt as to the enforceability of the credit by the benefi-
ciary. The binding effect of the banker's undertaking vis-A-vis the
beneficiary is thus axiomatic. It is inexplicable at common law
and must be attributed to mercantile usage. 38
II. The Autonomy of the Letter of Credit
It is basic to letter of credit law that the credit be autonomous
in relation to the contract between the account-party and
beneficiary. 39 The issuer's engagement towards the beneficiary "is
quite independent of the primary agreement between the
[account] party and the beneficiary. ' 40 In connection with the
commercial credit, the issuer's engagement "constitutes a
[separate] bargain between the banker and the vendor of the
goods, which imposes upon the banker an absolute obligation to
irrevocable credit is an essential term of the contract for sale and not a condition
precedent to the seller's obligation under the sale agreement. For an extensive
discussion see Clarke, op. cit., footnote 26, at pp. 264-9. Alternative common law
theories are critically discussed by Gutteridge and Megrah, op. cit., footnote 2, at pp.
28-33; Ellinger, op. cit., footnote 2, at pp. 39-125; and Kozolchyk, op. cit., footnote 2,
at pp. 575-604.
35 Gutteridge and Megrah, op. cit., footnote 2, at p. 25.
36 Ellinger, op. cit., footnote 2, at p. 122.
37 Kozolchyk, op. cit., footnote 2, at p. 595; Goode, op. cit., footnote 9, at p. 659.
38 For a comprehensive discussion, see also G.W. Bartholomew, "Relations between
Banker and Seller Under Irrevocable Letters of Credit", 5 McGill L.J. 89 (1959).
39 See e.g., Ellinger, op. cit., footnote 8, at p. 47, and for an overview, B. Geva, "Con-
tractual Defences as Claims to the Instrument: The Right to Block Payment on a
Banker's Instrument", 58 Ore. L. Rev. 283 (1979), at pp. 288-92.
40 See Dulien Steel Products, Inc. of Washington v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922
(S.D.N.Y., 1960), at p. 927, per Bryan Dist. J., affd 298 F. 2d 836 (2d Cir., 1962),
commented on by Ellinger in "The Autonomy of Letters of Credit", 4 Malaya L. Rev.
307 (1962). See also Foreign Venture, Ltd. v. Chemical Bank, 399 N.Y.S. 2d 114 (App.
Div., 1977), at p. 116; Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 96 N.Y.S. 2d 779
(S.C., 1949), at p. 791.
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pay, irrespective of any dispute there may be between the parties
as to whether the goods are up to [sic] contract or not."41
The independence of the issuer's engagement is the letter of
credit's primary feature and distinguishes it from a guarantee
which, in connection with credit used in a sales transaction, is
secondary to the buyer's promise to pay the price. 42 The absolute
nature of the obligation is based on the terms of the letter of
credit as agreed upon by the account-party and issuer and
accepted by the beneficiary. 43  The characteristics of
independence and absolute obligation are fundamental to the
concept of letter of credit. Thus, "where ... the substantive provi-
sions require the issuer to deal not simply in documents alone,
but in facts relating to the performance of a separate contract ...
all distinction between a letter of credit and an ordinary guaranty
contract would be obliterated by regarding the instrument as a
letter of credit." 44 The essence of the issuer's undertaking is the
absolute promise of payment against the beneficiary's production
of documents specified in the letter.
The autonomy of the letter of credit, shaped in cases dealing
with commercial credits, has easily found its way to the standby
credit. The landmark English case is Edward Owen Engineering
Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd.45 In this case, the under-
taking of English suppliers to supply and install glass houses for
Libyan customers was backed by an instrument called a perfor-
mance guarantee. Notwithstanding its name, the instrument was
held not to be a guarantee but rather a standby letter of credit. 46
41 Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Industries Ltd., [1958] 2 Q.B. 127 (C.A.), at p.
129, per Jenkins L.J. See also Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank of New
York, 146 N.E. 636 (N.Y.C.A., 1925), at p. 639: the issuer is concerned "only in the
drafts and the documents accompanying them". The principle is known also as the
abstraction of the credit promise. See Kozolchyk, op. cit., footnote 2, at p. 465.
42 Ellinger, op. cit., footnote 8, at p. 47.
43 See e.g., Urquhart Lindsay and Co., Ltd. v. Eastern Bank, Ltd., [1922] 1 K.B. 318 at p.
323, per Rowlatt J.: by authorizing the issuer "to undertake to pay the amount of the
invoice as presented", the buyer "is taken for the purposes of all questions between
himself and his banker or between his banker and the seller to be content to accept the
invoices of the seller as correct".
44 See Wichita Eagle and Beacon Publishing Co. Inc. v. Pacific National Bank of San
Francisco, supra, footnote 4, at p. 1286. Cf. Davis O'Brien Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Bank of
Montreal, [1951] 3 D.L.R. 536, 28 M.P.R. 22 (N.B.S.C. App. Div.), where a narrow
construction was given to a reference to the contract for sale in the letter of credit.
45 [197713 W.L.R. 764 (C.A.).
46 Professor Goode classifies guarantees and performance bonds as a separate category
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It provided that the Libyan buyers could draw on the credit by
placing a simple demand with a Libyan bank. The Libyan bank's
undertaking was backed by the undertaking of an English bank to
pay it on first demand without any conditions or proof. On the
facts of the case, "it appeare[d] that the English suppliers had not
been in default at all. The only persons in default were the Libyan
customers. . . . Yet the Libyan customers appear to have
demanded payment from the [Libyan bank] on their guarantee.
The [Libyan bank] then claimed on [the English bank] .... 1,47
The English suppliers sought to enjoin the English bank from
making payment on the performance guarantee. In disposing of
the case, Lord Denning M.R. held that a "performance
guarantee stands on a similar footing to a letter of credit." 48 He
then added:
A bank which gives a performance guarantee must honour the guarantee
according to its terms. It is not concerned in the least with the relations
between the supplier and the customer; nor with the question whether the
supplier has performed his contracted obligation or not; nor with the
question whether the supplier is in default or not. The bank must pay
according to its guarantee, on demand, if so stipulated, without proof or
conditions .49
The English bank was thus allowed, and in fact required, to
honour its obligation, in effect at the expense of the English
suppliers. The suppliers were left with their breach of contract
claim against the Libyan buyers.
Edward Owen was relied upon in an Ontario decision dealing
with standby credits. In Aspen Planners Ltd. v. Commerce
Masonry & Forming Ltd.5 0 the plaintiff landowner entered into a
building contract with the defendant contractor. To secure
payment of its obligations to make progress payments, the
plaintiff requested its bank to issue several irrevocable letters of
credit to the contractor. Each letter provided that the bank would
pay to the contractor the amount due, against receipt of a
demand accompanied by a certificate of the contractor confirming
from standby credit. See Goode, op. cit., footnote 9, at pp. 696-701. For our purposes
this classification does not seem to be useful.
47 Supra, footnote 45, at p. 770, per Lord Denning M.R.
48 Supra, footnote 45, at p. 773.
49 Supra, footnote 45, at p. 773. The fraud exception then referred to by Lord Denning is
discussed in the text, infra, at footnotes 60-3.
50 (1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 546,7 B.L.R. 102, 25 O.R. (2d) 167 (H.C.J.).
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that moneys drawn had been or would be expended pursuant to
the building contract. The letter expressly provided that the
issuer would honour such demands " 'without enquiring whether
[the contractor had] a right as between [it] and [the landowner] to
make such demand and without recognizing any claim of [the
landowner].' "51
After the collapse of the building during construction but
before the final certificates of entitlement were submitted to the
bank by the contractor, the plaintiff brought an application for an
interim injunction to restrain the contractor from making further
drawings under the letters of credit and for an interim injunction
to restrain the issuing bank from paying such draws. The appli-
cation was dismissed. Quoting heavily from Edward Owen,52 Mr.
Justice Henry could not find a basis for granting the injunctions.
The bank could not be enjoined, since "[it was] obligated to pay
the contractor under the letter of credit against a certificate that
[was] not fraudulent to its knowledge,53 regardless of any dispute
between the plaintiff and the contractor under the building
contract. '54 It followed that "[it was] not within the [account-
party's] power to revoke or alter the terms of the letter of credit
nor [was] the bank entitled to do so. The bank [could not] refuse
payment at the instance of the [account-party]. Entitlement [was]
a matter between the bank and the contractor." 55
Henry J. further held that the plaintiff account-party could not
enjoin the beneficiary from drawing on the letter of credit.
Enjoining the contractor "from applying for and receiving a
payment from the bank under the letter of credit - a transaction
to which the plaintiff [account-party] is virtually a stranger," 55a
amounted, in Henry J.'s view, to "freezing a potential asset of the
contractor as security to satisfy a potential judgment. In effect it
is tantamount to execution before judgment. '56 Under those
circumstances, he did not "consider that such an interim
injunction should issue." 57
In result, the issuer's engagement to the beneficiary was
51 Ibid., at p. 548 D.L.R., p. 105 B.L.R.
52 Supra, footnote 45.
53 The fraud exception is extensively discussed in text, infra, at footnotes 70-104.
54 Aspen Planners, supra, footnote 50, at p. 551 D.L.R., p. 110 B.L.R., per Henry J.
55 Ibid.
55a Ibid., at p. 552 D.L.R., p. 111 B.L.R.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
7-9 C.B.L.J.
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regarded as being separate from, and autonomous in relation to,
the construction contract between the account-party and the
beneficiary. Claims and defences arising from the latter could not
be raised in resisting a claim on the former.
The autonomy of the letter of credit is clearly reflected in the
UCP. Under UCP Article 4, "[in credit operations, all parties
concerned deal in documents, and not in goods, services and/or
other performances to which the documents may relate." It is the
production of documents which entitles the beneficiary to
payment. 58 The UCP also states that "[ciredits, by their nature,
are separate transactions from the ... contracts on which they ,
may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound
by such contracts." 59
In support of the autonomy of the letter of credit, it is said that
the "elaborate commercial system" of financing sales of goods by
irrevocable credits "would break down completely if a dispute as
between the vendor and the purchaser was to have the effect of
'freezing' ... the sum in respect of which the letter of credit was
opened." 6 The irrevocable obligations assumed by banks under
documentary credits are said to be "the life-blood of international
commerce." 61 Underlying these observations are important
factors including the large sums often involved in letter of credit
transactions, the distance between the seller and buyer, and the
use of the letter of credit as immediate collateral by the seller. In
fact, the commercial credit is a payment mechanism designed to
make the buyer's payment contemporaneous with shipment of
the goods by the seller. It is a means of shifting the credit strain to
the buyer in case of a dispute. 62
Issuance of the credit could be viewed as analogous to deliv-
ering to the bank, in escrow, a bag of cash, to be delivered to the
58 See also UCP Article 6:
A beneficiary in no case can avail himself of the contractual relationships existing
between the banks or between the applicant for the credit and the issuing bank.
59 Article 3. See also Article 16(b): the issuer's determination to pay is to be made on the
basis of documents alone; and Article 19: banks assume no responsibility for force
majeure.
60 Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Industries Ltd., supra, footnote 41, at p. 129.
61 R.D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd., [1977] 3 W.L.R.
752 (Q.B.), at p. 761, per Kerr J., quoted with approval in Edward Owen, supra,
footnote 45, at p. 773.
62 See e.g., Comment, "The Rights of the Seller Under a Documentary Letter of Credit",
34 Yale L.J. 775 (1925), at p. 776.
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seller in exchange for the shipping documents. The autonomy of
the standby credit, however, cannot be based on the same
analogy and might only be justifiable by reference to the parties'
intentions. In this connection it is the parties' wish to use the
documentary guarantee, rather than the surety bond, which
invokes the autonomy of the banker's undertaking. This was
clearly elaborated in Aspen Planners63 where Henry J. had "much
sympathy for the [account-party] who sees the possibility of
obtaining an enforceable judgment disappearing."64 However, he
concluded, "that is the risk that [the account-party] took when
[he] arranged the letter of credit with the bank. '65 It is clear
therefore that it is the use of a particular instrument which
imports the entire body of letter of credit doctrines and policies
into the standby credit area. 65a
The autonomy of the letter of credit is not all-embracing. It is
subject to a few narrow exceptions. One of them is forgery. When
forged documents are presented by the beneficiary, the bank is
entitled to refuse payment if it discovers the forgery before
payment, 66 and it is entitled to recover the money from the
beneficiary as paid under mistake of fact if it makes the discovery
after payment. Yet forgery is not a real exception to the
autonomy principle. Strictly speaking, forged documents do not
comply with the terms of the credit, 67 and their tender should not
entitle the beneficiary to obtain payment.
The autonomy of the letter of credit also does not enable
parties to contravene public policy or circumvent a statutory or
regulatory scheme. Thus, for example, under s. 12(3) of the
Conditional Sales Act of Newfoundland, 68 where a conditional
seller repossesses goods from the defaulting buyer,
63 Supra, footnote 50.
64 Supra, footnote 50, at p. 552 D.L.R., p. 111 B.L.R.
65 Supra, footnote 50, at p. 552 D.L.R., pp. 111-12 B.L.R. See also American Bell Interna-
tional Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. N.Y., 1979), at p. 426,
where the court spoke of the account-party "knowingly and voluntarily [signing] a
contract allowing the Iranian government to recoup its downpayment on demand,
without regard to cause".
65a This point is elaborated and critically discussed, infra, in Part III.
66 See e.g., Bank Russo-Iran v. Gordon, Woodroffe & Co. Ltd. (October 3, 1972), as
quoted in Edward Owen, supra, footnote 45, at p. 772.
67 But note the difference which is said to exist between the tender of documents by the
beneficiary and their tender by any other holder of the draft: see Gutteridge and
Megrah, op. cit., footnote 2, at pp. 140-1. Only in the former case is the law consistent
with the view that the forged documents are non-conforming.
68 R.S. N. 1970, c. 56, as amended.
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(3) ... his right is restricted to repossession and sale of the goods and any
claim by him for the unpaid purchase price is by reason of the retaking of
possession and sale fully paid and satisfied.
No waiver of this provision can be made even by a corporate
buyer.69 Since the effect of repossession and resale is to constitute
full payment and satisfaction, this provision seems to foreclose
recovery against the buyer's guarantor.
If a seller secured a possible claim to a deficiency by requiring
the buyer to provide a standby credit to be called on demand by
the seller after repossession and resale of the goods, it appears
possible that the seller may recover his shortfall. The statutory
defence available to the buyer against the seller would seem to be
unavailable to a bank because the autonomy principle is an
answer to the seller's demand on the letter of credit. The buyer
would be obliged to pay the bank, not under his obligation under
the contract of sale, which has been extinguished, but rather on
his reimbursement undertaking as account-party in connection
with issuance of the letter of credit. However, it seems to us more
likely that a court would view the use of the documentary credit
under such circumstances as a scheme to avoid the protection
afforded by statute and that such a letter of credit would be
unenforceable on public policy grounds. 70
A well-established exception to the autonomy of the letter of
credit is fraud. The landmark case is Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder
Banking Corporation.71 In that case, the plaintiff account-party
brought an action to restrain the payment of drafts under a
commercial credit. He alleged that the seller delivered worthless
material instead of the contract goods. Acknowledging the
autonomy of the letter of credit, the court granted the injunction
and stated:
This is not a controversy between the buyer and seller concerning a mere
69 Corporate waivers with respect to similar statutory provisions are permitted in British
Columbia, Sale of Goods on Condition Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 373, as amended, s. 19;
Alberta, Law of Property Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-8, s. 49; and Saskatchewan, Limitation
of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16, as amended, s. 40.
70 In this context, compare to some American case law. One case allowed an issuing bank
to defend an action on a letter of credit obligating it to lend a sum of money greater than
that permitted by the applicable loan limit statute. Another held that an issuing bank
was not estopped from invoking a state statute setting a one-year limit on a letter of
obligations. See Counsel's Corner, "Sztenjing (Steining) The Letter of Credit: More
Strings for the Bow", 93 Ban. L.J. 954 (1976).
7131 N.Y.S. 2d 631 (S.C., 1941).
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breach of warranty regarding the quality of the merchandise; on the present
motion, it must be assumed that the seller has intentionally failed to ship
any goods ordered by the buyer. In such a situation, where the seller's fraud
has been called to the bank's attention before the drafts and documents
have been presented for payment, the principle of the independence of the
bank's obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended to
protect the unscrupulous seller.
72
The fraud exception is thus a rule of public policy that "must be
narrowly limited to situations ... in which the wrongdoing ... has
so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of
the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer be
served. ' 73  Accordingly, fraud must be egregious, clearly
supported by the evidence, and not merely alleged.74 It must be
"intentional" or "active" and limited to circumstances "where
the merchandise is not merely inferior in quality but consists of
worthless rubbish. ' 75 The fraud exception should thus not be
applicable to an improper demand made after a breach of
warranty relating to the quality of the goods. 76
A doctrinal rationale for the fraud exception was advanced by
Mr. Justice Cardozo even prior to Sztejn. "Worthless rubbish"
supplied in lieu of contract merchandise is an instance of total
failure of consideration. This failure of consideration is also a
matter between the seller and the bank. Thus, according to
72 Ibid., at p. 634, per Shientag J.
73 See Intraworld Industries, Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 336 A. 2d 316 (Pa. S.C., 1975), at
pp. 324-5, per Roberts J.
74 See in general, Henry Harfield, "Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions", 95 Ban. L.J.
596 (1978). For a recent case, see e.g., Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Board of
County Commissioners of Routt County, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Ser. 1681 (Colo. S.C., 1981),
at p. 1691.
75 Sztejn, supra, footnote 71, at p. 635. For a recent case supporting the "intentional
fraud" test, see West Virginia Housing Development Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107
(W.D. Pa., 1976).
76 Sztejn, supra, footnote 71, at p. 635. See also H. Finkelstein, Legal Aspects of
Commercial Letters of Credit (New York, Columbia University Press, 1930), p. 248. But
see NMC Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Ser.
1427 (N.Y. S.C., 1974), where the seller's fraudulent warranty formed the ground for an
injunctive relief against the issuer. The case is criticized convincingly, together with
other recent deviations from the autonomy of letters of credit, by Justice B. Jack in
"Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations - Part 2", 94 Ban. L.J. 493 (1977), at
pp. 502-3. For cases suggesting an alternative "flexible standard" for determining fraud
(e.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 392 N.Y.S. 2d 265 (1976),
at p. 271) or that fraud must not necessarily be intentional (e.g., Dynamics Corporation
of America v. Citizens and Southern National Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga., 1973),
at p. 998), see Note, "Letters of Credit: Injunction As a Remedy for Fraud in U.C.C.
Section 5-114", 63 Minn. L. Rev. 487 (1979), at pp. 497-500.
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Cardozo J.'s dissent in Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park
Bank of New York, 77 the issuing bank which advances money
upon a commercial letter of credit "acts not merely upon the
credit of its customer, but upon the credit also of the merchandise
which is to be tendered as security. '78 Having misrepresented
"the security upon which advances are demanded," 79 the seller
should not be entitled to these advances. This view was echoed in
Sztejn where the court acknowledged that "in the issuance of the
letter of credit ... the security afforded by the merchandise is also
taken into account. 80
There are, however, a few difficulties with this analysis. To
begin with, total failure of consideration may arise in situations
not involving fraud, as for example, where the wrong
merchandise was mistakenly shipped to the buyer. Hence, the
fraud exception contemplates total failure of consideration on the
basis of totally worthless goods. 81 Secondly, the reality is that the
bank does not rely substantially on the security of the goods. In
Canada, credit is extended to the buyer under the documentary
credit on the basis that the bank's contingent liability is within the
bank customer's over-all line of approved credit. Thirdly, the
very existence of beneficiary's warranties, running in favour of
the issuer as to the quality of the goods, is a very dangerous
opening which may easily be extended to cases other than cases
involving total failure of consideration. Finally, the theory does
not work in connection with the standby credit where the
documents do not represent title to goods and therefore do not
constitute security in the banker's hands.82 Nevertheless, the
concept of total failure of consideration would appear to be valid,
77 146 N.E. 636 (N.Y.C.A., 1925).
78 Ibid., at p. 641, per McLaughlin J.
79 Ibid.
80 Supra, footnote 71, at p. 635. For a recent review of Sztejn and related issues, see
Turcotte, "Duty to Honour Drafts under a Letter of Credit", 2 Natl. Ban. L. Rev. 84
(1983), at pp. 87-9.
81 See e.g., Ellinger, "The Tender of Fraudulent Documents Under Documentary Letters
of Credit", 7 Malaya L. Rev. 24 (1965), at p. 38, where he suggests that Sztejn applies
only where "[tihe facts .. . speak for themselves". Thus, "[t]he description of old,
worthless, newspapers as 'class I typing paper' is inconsistent with anything but a fraud.
But, if the goods shipped are not altogether worthless, the banker should be advised not
to rely on the fraud rule."
82 The difficulties in fitting the fraud exception to the standby credit transaction are clearly
demonstrated in American Bell International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, supra,
footnote 65.
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at least in connection with the commercial credit. In so far as it is
based on the relationship between the issuer and the beneficiary
and on the beneficiary's misrepresentation as to the documents,
the analysis does not undermine, in theory at least, the autonomy
of the letter of credit. 83
There is, however, another difficulty with Cardozo's analysis
that seems to undermine it altogether. In Sztejn, as in most cases,
it was the issuing bank which wanted to pay and the applicant
who wanted to block payment. Normally, in the case of a letter of
credit dispute, the applicant's bank branch will be inclined to
support the customer or at least to assist him. This attitude stems
partly from the nature of the banker-customer relationship and
partly from the fact that payment for an account-party who did
not obtain performances from the beneficiary may put the
account-party (the bank's customer) into serious financial difficul-
ties. Depending on the amount of the credit, the banker might be
truly concerned with its security or with the customer's solvency.
In the final analysis, however, in making its decision to pay, the
bank takes into account the interests of its international
department concerning the integrity of the letter of credit device
generally and the international reputation of the bank. These
factors tend to outweigh all other considerations. Since the
banker wants to pay, the theory of the breach of the beneficiary's
warranty running in favour of the banker as a defence to the
banker, is divorced from the reality. Indeed, in applying the fraud
exception courts purport to protect the beneficiary, not the
banker. To base this protection on a warranty running from the
beneficiary to the bank is, in a relationship to which the applicant
is technically a stranger, quite inconsistent with basic principles.
Sztejn has been cited with approval by several English courts. 84
So far, it has never been followed by them. The standard adhered
to in these cases was "established or obvious fraud", 85 or "a clear
fraud," 86 none of which has ever been found in any decided case.
83 In this respect there is no real distinction between "fraud in the documents" and "fraud
in the transaction" (referred to in UCC 5-114(2)), since the latter is reflected in a misre-
presentation as to the accuracy of the documents.
84 See e.g., Discount Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315 (Ch.), at
pp. 318-19; R. D. Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank Ltd., [1977]
3 W.L.R. 752 (Q.B.), at p. 762; Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v Barclays Bank Inter-
national Ltd., [1977] 3 W.L.R. 764 (C.A.), at p. 771.
85 Edward Owen, ibid.
86 Ibid. , at p. 773.
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Thus, in Discount Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. ,87 the
buyer sought an injunction against the paying bank to restrain
payment on the basis of shortfall in delivery, the delivery of
defective goods, and the fraudulent alteration of serial numbers.
The application was dismissed since mere allegation of fraud is
not sufficient to invoke the injunctive relief. In Edward Owen,
Lord Denning acknowledged breach of contract by the
beneficiary 88 but could not find evidence to support a clear fraud.
The most recent high authority is the decision of the House of
Lords in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank
of Canada.89 In this case, the confirming bank refused to honour
the credit since the bills of lading were fraudulently backdated by
the loading broker without the knowledge of the beneficiary. The
backdating was made to give the appearance of compliance with
the terms of the credit. Citing Sztejn, as approved in Edward
Owen, Lord Diplock acknowledged the existence of the fraud
exception, but found it limited to material fraudulent misrepre-
sentations of fact by the beneficiary in presenting the documents
to the issuing or confirming bank. As such, the exception was
inapplicable to the facts of the case and the court stated:
The exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail
himself of the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non
oritur actio or ... "fraud unravels all." The courts will not allow their
process to be used by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud. 9°
On the facts of the case, fraud was neither committed by, nor
known to, the beneficiary and consequently the fraud exception
did not apply. Lord Diplock left open the question of forgery of a
document of which the beneficiary was not aware.
The decision was characterized as representing "the high water
mark of the principle of autonomy of the documentary credit.",91
Its holding is consistent with the view that bases the fraud
exception on the misrepresentation of the beneficiary towards the
bank as to the content of the documents. But the decision was
based on total failure of consideration rather than fraudulent
misrepresentation. In circumstances in which the facts speak for
87 Supra, footnote 84.
88 See, supra, text at footnote 47.
89 [198212 W.L.R. 1039 (H.L.).
90 Ibid., at p. 1045,per Diplock L.J.
91 Clive M. Schmitthoff, "Export Trade", [1983] J. Bus. L. 319 at p. 321.
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themselves, total failure of consideration is a mere example of
fraud; it does not exhaust the entire principle. The key is, none
the less, fraud of the beneficiary on the issuer and not on the
account-party.
Compared to their English counterparts, Canadian courts have
been less hesitant to invoke the fraud exception. On one hand,
courts in Canada have adhered to the distinction between
commercial disputes and fraud, and refused to disregard the
autonomy of the letter of credit as to the former cases. Thus, in
Aspen Planners,91a Henry J. viewed the account-party's claim
against the contractor based on the collapse of the building as a
commercial dispute. Under these facts there was no fraud on the
contractor's part in demanding payment.92 Likewise, in C.D.N.
Research and Development Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia93
(hereafter the "Iraq case") the court found that demand made on
a standby credit designed to secure the supply of goods was not
fraudulent. The goods were not supplied by the account-party
seller, which claimed fundamental breach on the beneficiary-
buyer's part. In the court's view, this was precisely the type of
commercial dispute that could not be invoked in connection with
the engagement on the letter of credit. The court relied on
Edward Owen but seemed to prefer the test of "prima facie case
of fraud" over Lord Denning's "clear fraud. '94 Since even a
prima facie case of fraud was not shown, no injunction was
granted.
On the other hand, in an earlier case between the same parties
(the "Iran case")95 on another standby credit, Galligan J. did
grant an injunction. The facts were quite similar to the Iraq case,
with one major difference: the goods were, in fact, supplied to
the buyer. Accordingly, "the plaintiff [account-party-seller had]
established ... a good prima facie case of fraud on the part of the
[beneficiary-buyer]." 96 As was subsequently explained in the Iraq
case, "[tihe demand [in the Iran case] was fraudulent ... because
91a Supra, footnote 50.
92 See in general, supra, text at footnotes 50-7.
93 (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d) 656, 39 O.R. (2d) 13 (H.C.J. Div. Ct.), varg 122 D.L.R. (3d)
485, 32 O.R. (2d) 578 (H.C.J.).
94 Ibid., at p. 662 D.L.R., p. 19 O.R.
95 C.D.N. Research & Development Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1980), 18 C.P.C. 62
(Ont. H.C.J.).
96 Ibid., at p. 65.
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delivery of the goods had clearly been made and yet the call was
on the basis of non-delivery." 97
The fraud exception was next applied in Rosen v. Pullen.98 The
case involved a standby letter of credit issued in connection with
the financial aspects of a cohabitation agreement. A man
procured the issuance of the letter of credit in a woman's favour,
on the understanding that she would not call on the letter unless
certain conditions were satisfied. These conditions were not
reflected in the terms of the credit. The woman called on the
letter even though the conditions had not been satisfied. The
court concluded that once it was shown that, as toward the
account-party, the beneficiary was not entitled to call on the
credit, a prima facie case of fraud had been established.
A recent reported case involving the application of the fraud
exception is Henderson v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce.99 In that case, the plaintiff account-party arranged for
the issue of a standby credit in connection with his undertaking to
pay the purchase price of units of entitlement in television shows.
The shows were never produced and after the insolvency of the
beneficiary its receiver demanded payment under the letter of
credit. The account-party sought an interim injunction to stop the
bank from making payment. The application was granted. The
court followed Rosen v. Pullen and specifically disapproved of
United City Merchants. In the opinion of Berger J., "[t]he
exception based on fraud, as that conception is understood in
equity, has been thus broadened, and the case at bar falls within
it."' 1 Calling on a credit with knowledge of lack of entitlement
constitutes fraud and does not entitle the beneficiary to payment.
All three cases, the Iran case, Rosen v. Pullen and Henderson
(hereafter the "injunction cases"), represent an unwarranted
intrusion into the documentary nature of the credit. The benefi-
ciary under each letter of credit was not required to state that the
pre-conditions were fulfilled and, therefore, no fraudulent
document was submitted by him. All three cases seem to replace
a "fraudulent document" with a "fraudulent demand" require-
ment; if their logic is to be pursued, every wrongful demand by a
97 Supra, footnote 93, at p. 662 D.L.R., p. 19 O. R., per Smith J.
98 (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 62, 16 B.L.R. 28 (Ont. H.C.J.).
99 (1982), 40 B.C.L.R. 318 (S.C. in Chambers).
100 Ibid., at p. 320.
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breaching party is fraudulent. This seems to undermine the whole
concept of the autonomy of the letter of credit.
It should be emphasized, however, that each of the three
injunction cases involved an interlocutory injunction. Interlo-
cutory injunction cases may be decided summarily, and
sometimes without the court having sufficient time or instruction
to allow reflection and well-reasoned decisions. Many unreported
interlocutory injunction cases have been brought to our attention
and do not follow the same direction as the reported cases. It is
impossible therefore to draw firm conclusions on the basis of the
three reported cases as to a likely direction the law may take. In
addition, at the time of this writing, a trial on the merits in
Henderson is pending, counsel having concluded that the matter
was too important to be left to an appeal of the interlocutory
application itself. The three cases should not be overlooked,
however, as a threat to the integrity of the autonomy principle.
In fact, all three injunction cases reflect the difficulties involved
in fitting the standby credit into the legal framework developed
for the commercial credit. Sztejn dealt with the obvious case of
"worthless rubbish" being supplied instead of the contracted
goods, as well as the procurement of fraudulent documents to
induce payment. It is likely that the applicant, having intended
that the timing of payment on the documentary credit would
coincide with tender of the shipping documents, never intended
to assume the risk that the contracted goods would not be
shipped. This should be contrasted with the situation in all three
injunction cases where the very issuance of the letter of credit
created the risk, clearly assumed by the applicant, of a call by the
beneficiary notwithstanding non-fulfilment of related conditions
precedent in the underlying contract between the account-party
and beneficiary. Furthermore, in Henderson, it is very likely that
issuance of the letter of credit was, and was perceived to be, in
lieu of cash payment, and that the parties chose the letter of
credit alternative simply as an efficient financing technique during
a period of high interest rates. By enjoining payment, the court in
effect gave the applicant the equivalent of a security interest in
the insolvent beneficiary's assets. Not having bargained for this,
the applicant may thus have obtained a windfall at the expense of
other unsecured creditors.
In the final analysis, the autonomy of the letter of credit
certainly should not be interfered with except in circumstances
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where its existence frustrates the original expectations of the
parties and arguably not even then. In this respect, United City
Merchants can be misleading. The facts of the case were peculiar.
There the backdating of the document was fraud perpetrated
directly against the issuer. The court, however, was not able to
find fraudulent misrepresentation by the beneficiary. The fact
situations involved in the three reported injunction cases,
however, were concerned with fraud alleged to have been
directed primarily at the applicant. In that context, the parties'
objective expectations should perhaps have determined the
autonomy issue. As it dealt with quite different facts, United City
Merchants should not be taken to provide guidance. As for the
three injunction cases, the parties' expectations unfortunately
played no role in the decisions.
It is noteworthy that an interim ex parte injunction allocates the
initial credit strain to the beneficiary. Futhermore, the scope of
the fraud exception is primarily a matter of law. If any call by a
breaching party constitutes fraud, the final outcome of the
litigation on the issuer's liability will not be different than the one
reached at the early interim injunction stage.
A remaining question in Canadian jurisprudence is the position
of the issuing bank which knows of the fraud but is not restrained
by an injunction. May it refuse to pay? Does it pay at its peril?
The matter is dealt with in UCC Article 5 in an equivocal
manner. Under UCC 5-114(2)(b), in the case of fraud, "an issuer
acting in good faith may honor the ... demand for payment
despite notification from the customer of fraud ... but a court of
appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor." Hence, in the
absence of an injunction, the issuer "acting in good faith" may
honour the credit despite knowledge of the fraud. The section is
contradictory since it is not clear how a bank which knows of
fraud may be said to pay in good faith. Perhaps the distinction is
between notification of the fraud by the customer, and the bank's
knowledge of the fraud. In the former case, where the bank is
notified but is not convinced of the correctness of the allegation,
it might honour the credit unless it is enjoined from doing so.
Yet, it is unreasonable to expect the bank to know of the fraud,
or be convinced that it exists. At the most, the bank knows of its
customer's complaint as to the fraud. Hence, the test of UCC 5-
114(2) appears to be quite illusory. 10 1
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In United City Merchants102 the underlying assumption clearly
was that the bank should not pay in the face of knowledge of the
beneficiary's fraud. 10 3 A recent Quebec Court of Appeal decision
is to the same effect. 1°4 It is submitted, however, that this rule is
not responsive to sound policy considerations. The bank cannot
be expected to determine the existence of fraud. The better view
would be to give the bank the discretion to withhold payment at
its peril, but at the same time the duty to give a concerned
customer a reasonable time to obtain an injunction. In practice, it
is not uncommon for a bank to discuss the benefit of obtaining an
injunction with its customer, and to allow a short period of time
for it to be obtained. The bank cannot be forced to withhold
funds unduly, however, only because it knows that the account-
party claims fraud.
III. Parties' Intentions and the Autonomy Principle
It was stated earlier that invocation of the autonomy principle
in standby letters of credit can only be justified by reference to
the intention of the parties, and that it is their wish to use the
documentary credit which invokes the autonomy of the banker's
undertaking. 10 5 The basis of ascertaining this intention will now
be examined. The discussion will necessitate some re-
examination of the autonomy principle as applied to the standby
credit.
The starting point is the language of the letter of credit itself.
Where autonomy is intended, the letter should indicate that it is
governed by the UCP. This is not to suggest that there should be
permitted a class of letters of credit, standby or not, which would
not be autonomous because they do not adopt the UCP. Rather,
we suggest simply that it will be prudent to evidence the intention
101 For a critique on the elective dishonour, see e.g., Note, supra, footnote 76, at pp.
508-16.
102 Supra, footnote 89.
103 This was not an injunction case. The bank refused to pay and the issue was whether this
was proper in the absence of the beneficiary's own fraud.
1O4 Angelica-Whitewear Ltd. and Angelica Corp. v. The Bank of Nova Scotia (March 3,
1983, Que. C.A.), discussed by Turcotte, op. cit., footnote 80, at pp. 88-9. "The matter
is now before the Supreme Court of Canada": see Turcotte, ibid., at p. 89.
105 See, supra, text preceding footnote 63.
1984]
206 Canadian Business Law Journal
that an instrument is, in fact, intended to be a letter of credit so
that application of the autonomy principle will follow automati-
cally. The practice of expressly adopting the UCP may become
particularly important under the 1983 Revision, in which standby
credits will be referred to expressly, and in connection with the
increasing occurrence of the issuance of letters of credit by non-
banks. In the former case, failure to adopt the 1983 Revision by
express reference could bear the inference that the relative
instrument was not perceived by the parties to be a letter of
credit, at least if other circumstances, such as reference to the
instrument as a guarantee or performance bond, also supported
such a conclusion. In the case of issuance of the instrument by a
non-bank financial institution which customarily or historically
did not issue letters of credit, the reference to the UCP would
eliminate concern as to the parties' intention. The instrument
should not be entitled "letter of guarantee" or anything else that
might suggest the parties intended a relationship different from
that of issuer and beneficiary.
It could well be that in Edward Owen,1°6 Lord Denning was too
eager to conclude that a "performance guarantee stands on a
similar footing to a letter of credit. ' 10 7 No evidence of applicable
mercantile usage was introduced in that case. However, the risk
of characterizing a letter of credit as a guarantee could be
minimized by eliminating terminology and terms associated with
other devices. As for the conditions which call for the issuer's
duty to pay, pure demand language might prove counter-
productive. Courts might consider that the obligation to pay on
simple demand would implicitly be subject to certain pre-
conditions being satisfied. From a drafting standpoint, detailed
language seems to be more prudent. For example, in Aspen
Planners,108 the issuer expressly agreed to honour demands
accompanied by completion certificates " 'without enquiring
whether [the beneficiary had] a right as between [himself] and
[the account-party] to make such demand and without recog-
nizing any claim of [the account-party].' "109 Issuing banks might
bolster such language by specifically referring to types of possible
106 [1977] 3 W.L.R. 764 (C.A.).
10 Ibid., at p. 773; see, supra, text at footnote 48.
108 (1979), 100 D.L.R. (3d) 546,7 B.L.R. 102, 25 O.R. (2d) 167 (H.C.J.).
1 09 1bid.,atp. 548 D.L.R., p. 105 B.L.R.
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disputes from which the banker's obligation would be insulated,
including breach of contract, fundamental breach, insolvency or
bankruptcy, cessation of business, misrepresentation and inade-
quacy in performance.
The language of a letter of credit, however, would not always
be a reliable indicator of the parties' intention. Except for major
financings, the letter of credit is not a negotiated document.
Often it is a standard form imposed by the issuing bank or the
beneficiary. The parties' intention should perhaps be determined
primarily on the basis of underlying agreement and on the basis of
the business function that the standby credit fulfils in the context.
The combined forces of high interest rates and recession, in
recent years, have promoted the use of standby credits in situa-
tions where their use as the functional equivalent of cash is
undeniable. In support of this, one need only consider their use in
tax-shelter investments where the standby credit fees are low-cost
alternatives to spread costs associated with actual advance
payments. For example, a subscription for a film unit in a
financing of a high-risk movie project might be purchased on the
following terms:
The Film Units will be issued at a price of $10,000 each. Subscribers for
Film Units will be required to complete a Subscription Form ... and submit
the same to a selling agent, together with, for each Film Unit subscribed
for:
(i) a cheque in the amount of $10,000 payable to the selling agent; or
(ii) a cheque in the amount of at least $1,000 payable to the selling agent,
together with an interest-bearing Promissory Note in the form attached
hereto as Schedule "C" for the balance of the Subscription Price,
supported by a Letter of Credit issued by a Canadian chartered bank or
other financial institution in the form of Schedule "C" hereto or in such
other form as the Production Company's bankers may accept.
In the above example, the letter of credit is intended as an
unconditional immediate credit facility. It is designed to enhance
the credit of the beneficiary at the time of issuance as if cash had
actually been paid. These were likely the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of the letter of credit in Henderson.110 In
such a case the letter of credit is given as a pure payment device
and not as collateral security."' It resembles the commercial
credit as much as a typical standby credit, but it is not employed
110 Supra, footnote 99.
111 Cf., supra, text at footnote 28.
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in the conventional setting of the commercial credit and is
classified as a standby credit. Functionally, it serves, immediately
on its issuance, as the equivalent of a cash payment. It therefore
functions as a payment mechanism earlier in time than the tradi-
tional commercial credit. It seems self-evident that such a letter
of credit is intended to be autonomous, since it is intended to
function as the equivalent of immediate cash payment.
The intention that the autonomy principle apply emerges
clearly in connection with international project financing. Often,
foreign governments insist on receiving a standby credit,
drawable on simple demand, as a prerequisite to their dealing
with a foreign investor. Corporations which procure the issuance
of such letters of credit are aware of and accept the risks involved.
Sound policy would not justify the interference by courts in such
business decisions. Edward Owen, 112 the Iraq case' 13 and the Iran
case 11 4 all involved credits issued under such circumstances.
The position, however, is not so clear in all cases. In a domestic
transaction, a standby credit could be used as collateral security
rather than as an immediate cash equivalent. For example, where
a landowner requires a construction company to provide a
standby credit to secure performance of the construction
contract, the parties may simply intend use of the credit as an
inexpensive substitute for a performance bond.15 The standby
credit is substantially cheaper, partly because of the advantages
an issuing bank typically will have in obtaining security or relying
on existing security. Normally, the construction company's assets
are charged in favour of lenders such as the issuing bank. The
surety on the performance bond will not be able to take security
in the construction company's assets to protect its position on the
latter's default. 116 For that and other important reasons, the
surety may charge substantially more than a bank for the facility
offered by it. Accordingly, the parties' choice of the standby
112 Supra, footnote 106.
113 Supra, footnote 93.
114 Supra, footnote 95.
115 The performance bond is a guarantee of performance. The obligee (landowner) may
not call upon it in the absence of the principal's (construction company's) failure to
perform. Stated otherwise, as against the obligee, the defence of the principal's perfor-
mance is available to the surety.
116 Some aspects of the surety's security position vis-A-vis the construction lender, from an
American law viewpoint, are discussed in B. Geva, "Bonded Construction Contracts:
What are a Surety's Rights to Withhold Funds?", 3 Corp. L. Rev. 50 (1980).
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credit may reflect an attempt to reduce costs, rather than a desire
to have the autonomy principle apply.
In a situation such as that involved in Aspen Planners,117 where
the landowner may be required by the construction company to
procure the issuance of a letter of credit to ensure payment for
the construction, the parties might intend the credit to serve as a
guarantee of the landowner's payment obligations. Their choice
of the standby credit might reflect the absence of any other credit
facility tailored to their needs, 118 rather than adoption of the
autonomy principle.
Nevertheless, the application of the autonomy principle to the
cases discussed in the two preceding paragraphs may be justified
on the basis of the parties' intentions. Because they chose the
standby facility, the parties were not forced to resort to a simple
demand payment mechanism. Parties may have no control over
the drafting of the letter of credit, but they do control the
documentary requirements. Indeed, in a typical commercial
credit setting, the banker is not required to pay on the seller's
bare demand. Rather, a demand for payment on a commercial
credit must be accompanied at least by the shipping documents
evidencing actual shipment of the goods. Such documents are
issued by the carrier, who is not a party to the seller-buyer
contract. Not infrequently, under the terms of the credit, the
seller's demand on the commercial credit must also be accom-
panied by a third party's certificate indicating the quality of the
goods shipped. This requirement prevents the seller from making
a discretionary demand.
In theory, control of documentary requirements is also
available to users of the standby credit. Where the standby credit
secures performance by a construction company, its terms should
require that drawings by the landowner must be supported by an
engineer's certificate specifying the construction company's
failure of performance. Moreover, where the landowner's under-
taking to pay a construction company is supported by a standby
credit, as in Aspen Planners,119 the terms of the credit should
provide for payment against a completion certificate issued by an
117 Supra, footnote 108.
118 Neither sureties nor financial institutions issue in the normal course of their businesses
simple guarantees of monetary obligations.
119 Supra, footnote 108.
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agreed engineer. In Aspen Planners, demands were to be made
upon the production of the contractor's own certificate. 120
In other words, mechanisms protecting the account-party's
rights can be established within the framework of the
documentary requirements without undermining the autonomy
principle. The parties' choice of the letter of credit device, accom-
panied by their own failure to build any protection mechanism
into the documentary requirements, appears to justify the final
result in Aspen Planners.
The preceding analysis presupposes that parties know what
they are doing and that there is no defect in the bargaining
process. At the same time, if parties are not aware of the
autonomy principle and of the distinction between a standby
credit and a performance bond or a guarantee, their failure to
provide for proper documentary requirements cannot indicate
their true intentions. One could attempt to meet this objection by
arguing that two business parties, advised by lawyers, are
presumed to know the law with regard to these matters. In
reality, however, the possibility of the parties' ignorance of the
implications of the use of letters of credit presents banks with a
dilemma.
Courts may take seriously the question of the parties'
ignorance of and even their lawyers' lack of insight in this
technical area of banking law. The courts thus might attempt to
encourage educational efforts to explain the crucial points to all
concerned. When the courts determine that the parties' failure to
provide for the appropriate documentary requirements reflects
ignorance, rather than a deliberate intention in the context of the
over-all contractual arrangement, they might be inclined to refuse
to apply the autonomy principle. This might be accomplished by
purporting to expand or liberally apply the exceptions to the
principle, including the fraud exception. If this misfortune
occurred, the autonomy principle would be fundamentally endan-
gered, if not lost. There would also be no assurance that the
doubts and uncertainties which would become associated with,
and perhaps quickly destroy, the standby credit, would not also
be carried to the traditional commercial credit. The fraud
exception would be difficult to contain and might thus be
broadened to include the making of a demand by a breaching
120 See, supra, text which follows footnote 50.
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seller. A buyer might be allowed to argue that in applying for the
issuance of a letter of credit he was not aware of the autonomy
principle and the related business risks. Undoubtedly the effec-
tiveness of the letter of credit would be impaired.
Such developments would be regrettable. The letter of credit is
used not only to provide the beneficiary with a solvent payor but
also as a means of allocating to the applicant the interim financial
burden during a contract dispute between the applicant and the
beneficiary. Undermining the autonomy of the letter of credit
would jeopardize its value as a payment device and also defeat
the intentions of the parties. Furthermore, the virtually uncondi-
tional nature of the banker's undertaking underlies the utility of
the letter of credit. The credit is immediate collateral in the hands
of the beneficiary, who may wish to use the future proceeds of the
credit as present security for loans from another bank. 12°a The
autonomy of the letter of credit is thus vital from a commercial
standpoint. Its vitality must be ensured by careful drafting as well
as by judicial caution.
In this framework, the few hard cases relating to standby
credits can be viewed as aberrant. The cases are difficult to
support. They involved situations in which the parties' intentions
to employ the instruments as letters of credit, with all attendant
consequences, were not easily discernible. To that extent, the
cases should not cast serious doubt on the scope of the autonomy
principle.
Conclusion
In Aspen Planners,121 Henry J. commented that "[n]either
counsel has offered any submission why [the commercial credit],
well established as an instrument of trade and commerce, should
not be used in respect of building contracts." 122 On this basis, he
discussed the liability of the standby credit issuer within the
framework of the law that had been established to apply to the
liability of the commercial credit issuer.
There is no reported case setting out a reasoned response to the
challenge posed by Henry J. It seems to be assumed universally
120a For such a use of the letter of credit see e.g., Aspen Planners, supra, footnote 108, at
p. 552 D.L.R., p. 112 B.L.R.
121 Supra, footnote 108.
122 1bid.,at p. 548 D.L.R., p. 106 B.L.R.
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that the letter of credit is not only a payment mechanism in inter-
national trade but also a tool available for use as a standby credit
facility, and that the applicant for a standby credit will success-
fully subject himself to the same body of law which governs use of
the commercial credit in international sale of goods transactions.
This premise is, however, to be treated with great caution.
As was indicated earlier, 2 3 as a matter of common law theory,
there are doctrinal difficulties in finding a satisfactory basis for the
binding effect of the issuer's engagement on any letter of credit.
Mercantile usage has served as the most satisfactory solution to
these difficulties, but this usage developed in connection with the
older and well-established commercial credit. The standby credit
is a recent phenomenon. Hence, the mercantile usage doctrine
may not apply.
So far the question has been overlooked and perhaps it is only
of marginal importance. After all, there are no doctrinal
difficulties at common law in charging the issuer with a
promissory estoppel from the time when the beneficiary has acted
in reliance on the credit. The difficulty with the absence of consid-
eration and the binding effect of the issuer's engagement relates
only to the period between the beneficiary's receipt of advice of
the credit and the time at which he acts upon it. Further, at least
with respect to commercial credits, the difficulty is perhaps of
little more than historical interest. Yet, the issue raises the
broader question of the applicability of commercial credit
mercantile usages and practices to the standby credit.
Even if governed by the same principles of law, standby credits
involve factual settings different from those in which commercial
credits are used. This gives rise to a potentially differing appli-
cation of the governing principles in the two contexts. The failure
to respond to this difference in context is reflected in the three
Canadian injunction cases 24 and raises serious uncertainties as to
the integrity of the letter of credit under Canadian law. The
continued vitality of the standby letter of credit in Canada
requires clear rejection of any tendency of Canadian courts to
erode the autonomy principle. Even the more legitimate question
of whether a particular instrument used in a given case is in fact a
letter of credit - so that its autonomy and other attributes of the
123 See, supra, text at footnotes 34-5.
124 See, supra, text which follows footnote 95.
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device would automatically apply - might best be resolved by
legislation or more precise banking practice. Any attempt atjudicial resolution, for example, by the development of objective
intention rules, might leave the distinction less than categorical.
In the time required for judicial development, uncertainty might
do irreparable harm. In result, the standby credit, which origi-
nated as an expansion of the letter of credit, could jeopardize the
utility of this well established and highly useful payment and
financing device.
In the final analysis, the basis for autonomy depends on the
parties' deliberate choice of the letter of credit facility. While the
autonomy principle should be virtually absolute, subject only to
the traditional narrow exceptions, the practical implications of
autonomy should be attuned to the business objectives. This
should be accomplished not by recognition of degrees of
autonomy, but by specificity in related documentary require-
ments.
Where circumstances are such that the parties intend that the
instrument be a letter of credit, courts may in hard cases refuse to
apply the autonomy principle to what might in fact be a standby
credit. To avoid unnecessary doubt and possible destruction of
the standby credit, any difficulties in resolving characterization
questions should be clearly addressed. In this way doubtful
practices will be avoidable, the autonomy of the standby credit
will be preserved and, most importantly, the commercial credit
will not suffer any unintended ripple effect from the uncertainty
surrounding standby credits.
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